Despite the large occurrence of cohabitation and its strong link to important behavioral outcomes, it has received little attention in the literature. We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to document the labor supply, housework hours, and fertility patterns of cohabiting partners. The data suggests that in comparison to marriage, cohabitation is associated with a lower degree of household specialization, higher relationship instability, and greater degree of positive assortative mating. We develop and estimate a dynamic model of household formation and dissolution, fertility and labor supply and use the estimated model to perform policy experiments that investigate the welfare implications of different institutional arrangements regarding divorce regulations. In a dynamic model of the household with limited commitment, marriage leads to equilibrium outcomes that are closer to the efficient allocation when there are gains from specialization. On the other hand, cohabitation enables partners to insure themselves against uncertainty regarding the match quality of the relationship. Each match has different gains from either living arrangement, depending on their observable characteristics, and match quality. Cohabitation provides a tradeoff between the advantages and disadvantages of getting married and remaining single. Our goal is to use the estimated model to assess the welfare implications of inefficiencies that may arise in co-residential relationships due to lack of commitment. JEL Classification Code: J12, J16, J31, J61
Introduction
The number of unmarried couples living together has increased significantly between 1960 and 2000. Today, there are 9.7 million Americans living with an unmarried different-sex partner.
More importantly, empirical evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics shows that marital stability, labor supply, and fertility of men and women differ considerably by whether they are cohabiting or legally married. This suggests that cohabitation constitutes a separate state of union compared to marriage, either in terms of the different characteristics of couples who choose to cohabit, or as a different institutional framework that changes the way in which partners interact.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that in comparison to marriage, cohabitation is associated with a lower degree of household specialization, higher relationship instability and higher degree of positive assortative mating. In other words, married women work less than single women, but the difference between cohabiting women and single women's labor supply is statistically insignificant. A similar analysis for men reveals that both cohabiting and married men tend to work more than single men, with married men working more than those cohabiting.
Patterns of marital sorting are quite different for cohabiting unions compared to married unions.
For example, in cohabiting unions correlation between the labor incomes of partners is much higher, compared to partners in married unions. 1 There are significant differences in the legal regulations unmarried cohabitants and married couples face in the United States. A major goal of family law is the protection of parties who have entered into long-term relationships of dependence and interdependence -both economic and noneconomic -and of their children. The law extends a variety of benefits to and imposes obligations upon couples in the officially sanctioned unions called marriage. These rights include the rights of partners against one another, such as remedies upon dissolution and inheritance, as well as the rights against third parties -such as state benefits, tort claims, health related benefits, and rights concerning children. In the United States, most of these marriage rights and benefits do not apply to unmarried cohabitants. 2 Due to lack of such benefits and protections, 1 A detailed exposition of these empirical facts including the controls included in these analyses can be found in the data section. 2 There is a wide variety of ways state legal systems in the United States treat cohabitation. The different approaches range from one extreme where cohabitants have no rights against one another or against third parties, to the other extreme, where cohabitants are treated as though they were married under state law. In Oregon, Washington, Nevada and California, a domestic partnership is almost equivalent to marriage. Within the last 3 decades, some states have adopted, either by case law or statute, a variety of protections for cohabitants. However, in general, the remedies offered to cohabitants in the United States are very limited in comparison to other countries. Moreover, even in states where marriage rights are fully extended to cohabiting partners, the laws allowing for domestic partners to obtain dissolutions, legal separations and annulments is new. There are many things that are still uncertain regarding property, custody and tax issues. unmarried partners are rendered vulnerable especially if the relationship ends. In many states in the US, the law of cohabitants' rights is mostly not adequate to protect the dependencies arising from long-term cohabitation or to compensate for the contributions made by either of the parties, especially the one who serves as a homemaker during the course of the relationship.
The current debate in the United States regarding family laws is whether the legal system should extend some or all of the protections inherent in marriage to unmarried cohabiting partners whose living arrangements are functionally similar to it. The relevant question for this debate is: What are the welfare implications of extending protections inherent in marriage to unmarried cohabiting partners? One of the goals of this paper is to address this question. In this paper, we assess the implications of family laws, such as regulations regarding divorce or dissolution of a cohabiting household, on intra-household allocation, fertility, household formation and dissolution patterns. In order to do this, we develop and estimate a dynamic model of household formation and dissolution, fertility and labor supply and use the estimated model to perform policy experiments that investigate the welfare implications of different institutional arrangements regarding family laws that govern dissolution of cohabiting relationships or marriages.
In this paper, the main distinction that we will emphasize is that unmarried cohabitants do not need to follow strict procedures to dissolve their living arrangements, whereas married couples do. 3 This feature of cohabitation enables partners to take advantage of the benefits of living together, without the commitment that legal marriage requires. For example, Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006) show that the lower cost of separation makes co-residential relationships attractive for couples, as it gives the opportunity to hedge against future bad shocks to the relationship quality while taking advantage of benefits of living together such as joint consumption of a public good, returns to specialization, and children. However, the lack of commitment in a cohabiting relationship relative to marriage has disadvantages, as the increased chance of dissolution may prevent the couple from fully realizing some of these benefits.
In the model, in each period a single individual meets a potential partner with an exogenous probability and decides whether he/she is going to continue being single, start cohabiting with the partner, or get married. In addition to their relationship, the agents choose in each period how to divide their time between housework, labor market work and leisure, and whether to have children or not. Working at a given period increases an individual's human capital, and hence future wages. The presence of children increases the marginal utility of the public good and therefore increase the relationship surplus. Agents face uncertainty regarding their earnings, 3 There are other legal differences between marriage and cohabitation that we will not consider in this paper, but that are nevertheless important. These involve the rights of partners against one another, such as remedies upon dissolution and inheritance, as well as the rights against third parties -such as state benefits, tort claims, health related benefits, and rights concerning children. Most of these rights have the purpose of recognizing the contribution of one partner to the property of the other upon dissolution.
their match quality if they are in a relationship, and whether they will have children. In order to characterize the allocations chosen by married/cohabiting individuals, we employ the collective household model in a dynamic framework with no commitment so that couples cooperate but they are unable to commit to future allocations as in Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2007) . For the couple's problem, we make the assumption that the outcomes to the household's allocation problem are constrained efficient so that the solution to the couple's problem is obtained by using a Pareto problem with participation constraints. Due to lack of commitment, the share of the total household resources that a partner receives is subject to change depending on his/her outside option each period. In addition, the partners are not able to commit to not separate in the future, and face uncertainty regarding future marital instability. This gives rise to inefficiencies within the relationship since (1) Household members cannot contract over transfers to be made in the future periods of the relationship, (2) Household members cannot make conditional transfers for future separation states. The potential for inefficiencies is higher for higher levels of probability of separation. Holding everything else constant, this probability is higher for a cohabiting couple as their cost of separation is lower. The size of the efficiency concerns depend on the home production technology and preferences.
In the model, the gains from living together are: (1) Joint consumption of a public good, (2) Specialization in home production and market work, (3) A match-specific benefit, which is observable to the partners, but is subject to change as the relationship progresses and (4) Children. The extent to which each of these gains are realized depends on whether the couple chooses to cohabit or get married. The tradeoff that the couple faces in making this choice is as follows. Cohabitation allows the partners to benefit from living together, without the requirement to face legal separation costs in the event of negative match specific shocks. Marriage makes future separation more costly, and this enables the agents to fully specialize. This also has implications on the degree of positive assortative mating for cohabiting unions in comparison to marital unions. This is because the substitution possibilities in the time inputs of the spouses in the household production function translates into different mating patterns depending on the degree of commitment. In this case, patterns of marital sorting observed in the data are strongly linked to the intra-household decision process, as in Del Boca and Flinn (2006) . This paper is also closely linked to Greenwood and Guner (2008) who look at the role of technological progress on marriage and labor market outcomes since World War II.
We are interested in the welfare implications of partners' inability to make binding agreements. Inefficiencies may arise in relationships due to lack of access to a commitment technology. 4 However, more importantly, individuals can choose the degree of commitment they have access to in their relationship, through choosing between marriage and cohabitation. These choices depend on their observable and unobservable characteristics, the characteristics of their potential matches, the quality of their match, as well as preferences and the home production technology.
In this paper, we develop a framework that allows us to control for such selectivity into different living arrangements (marriage, cohabitation, remaining single).
We structurally estimate the model using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which have detailed information on relationship and wage histories, as well as labor market and housework hours of partners. The model is estimated by simulated method of moments, which minimizes a weighted average distance between a set of sample moments and moments simulated from the model. We jointly estimate the model for two groups of cohorts in order to decompose the changes marriage, cohabitation and labor market outcomes into different contributing factors. In the estimation, we allow preferences as well as technology and wages that the younger and older cohorts face to be different. 
Full Model
In this section, we describe the behavioral model marriage, cohabitation and labor market search.
The subsequent section provides some intuition regarding empirical implications of the model through graphical illustrations of equilibrium outcomes in the specification that makes some simplifying assumptions on the full model. Agents make decisions regarding relationship status, employment, and fertility in each period.
At each age a, a single individual chooses the following: hours of labor market work (h a ), hours of housework (d a ), and whether to cohabit or marry (if he/she meets a potential partner) or continue search as a single person. When married, the individuals jointly choose: hours of labor market work and housework of both spouses, whether to become pregnant or not (if at a fecund age), and whether to stay married or separate. When cohabiting, individuals face the same alternatives as when they are married, with the addition of the decision to get married or not.
Preferences
The individual's utility flow depends on his/her private leisure, public good consumption (produced by a intra-household production technology with domestic labor supplies of the partners as inputs if married or cohabiting, private if single), number of children, and match quality (if married). The utility function of an individual of latent type j is given by,
where l i is leisure, Q the quantity of the public good produced in the household, θ a the match specific quality of at age a, n i0 is whether person i has any children from previous relationships and n i1 indicates the presence of children from the current relationship. Parents get utility a 0 and a 1 from children from previous or current relationships, respectively. The utility of marriage relative to cohabiting, u M AR (j), depends on the latent type. ξ denotes the relationship status and takes on three values: marriage, cohabitation, and being single. κ M and κ C indicate the cost of separating for a married couple and a cohabiting couple, respectively, so that the separation cost is determined by the relationship status in the preceding period (ξ a−1 ).
We also make a distinction between the presence of children each individual had prior to meeting their current partner and the presence of children they have with their current match.
The child utility is different depending on the current living arrangement of the parents. n i0 represents whether the agent has any children from a previous relationship but does not live with and n i1 indicates whether the agent has any children from the current relationship or a previous one. Parents' valuation of children is different by whether they are living with the parent of their child. This takes into account the fact that parents spend less time with their children when they are separated or divorced, as they share the time with the other parent.
Fertility and Children
Each period, married and cohabiting couples determine whether they want to try to have a child.
Whether they have an additional child the following period is a random event whose probability is determined by this choice.
Marriage Market and Match Quality
Every period, with probability p, a single individual meets a potential partner. Once a potential partner is drawn, the potential couple then draws a match quality of the partnership, given by θ. The couple then decides whether to marry/cohabit or whether to remain single and continue search. The problem that the couple faces when they are making this decision is outlined below in the household's problem section. If they decide to get married or cohabit, their match quality follows a Markov process during the course of their relationship, so that in each period they draw a new match quality conditional on the match quality in the previous period. As in Brown and Flinn (2006), we have a finite number of match quality values θ 1 , ...., θ M . The probability of a match quality of θ j increasing to θ j+1 is given by P + θ if j < M . The probability of a match quality of θ j decreasing to θ j+− is given by P − θ if j > 1.
Home Production Technology
There is a public good that is domestically produced using the domestic labor supplies of the partners as inputs. The intra-household production technology is given by Q(d m , d f , g), where d m , d f are the partners' number of housework hours and g is the amount of goods purchased in the market for the production of the public good. The output of the intra-household production process is not observable and is not marketable. At age a, the public good is produced according to the following technology:
where g a is the amount of market purchased goods, and D a is the effective housework hours.φ governs the extent to which the presence of kid in a household shift the productivity of housework hours. In the case of couples, this is the wife's children from previous marriages in addition to children from current marriage. φ shifts the productivity of housework hours as long as there is any children in the household, regardless of the number of children. D a is defined as,
Budget Constraint
The couple's labor income is given by the sum of their earnings, w m a h m a + w Single Males :
where Υ 1 is the cost of a child they incur if the child is from a previous relationship and Υ 2 is the cost of a child they incur if the child is from the current relationship. It is assumed that once separated, the partners share the cost of child equally so that Υ 1 = Υ 2 2 .
Household's Problem
The problem of a cohabiting/married couple is as follows. The first best allocation to the couple's problem can be derived by solving the following social planner's problem: max hm,a,hm,a,lm,a,lm,a,pa
The 
We can reformulate this problem in its recursive form using the approach of Marcet and Marimon When a couple first meets, the initial Pareto weight is determined by a Nash bargaining problem that assigns both potential partners equal bargaining weight, where the outside option for both potential partners is to remain single.
Discussion
In the model, the gains from marriage/cohabitation stem from the joint consumption of a public good in the household, specialization, a match-specific utility, as well as utility that is specific to marriage. These generate positive economic gains from marriage in the sense that the output the partners generate together is greater than the sum of the outputs that the partners can obtain separately. However, the extent to which each of these gains are realized depends on whether the couple chooses to cohabit or get married.
The tradeoff that the couple faces in making this choice is as follows. The couple faces some uncertainty regarding their match quality, and this uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of the second period: (1) Cohabitation provides an opportunity to hedge against future negative match quality shocks. Therefore, cohabitation allows the partners to benefit from the advantages of living together, without the requirement to face legal separation costs in the event of negative match specific shocks, (2) Marriage makes future separation more costly and this enables spouses to fully specialize at home and in the labor market. The first is the only benefit of cohabitation relative to marriage in the model. The latter advantage of marriage arises when each partner has a comparative advantage at home or in the labor market. When the partners have a comparative advantage in the labor market or at home and when their inputs into the home production technology are close substitutes, the efficient solution to the household problem entails full specialization. For example, consider a case where the female's productivity at home is higher than the male's and/or male's productivity in the labor market is higher relative to hers.
In this case, the efficient solution entails her to work in household production and him to work in the labor market. When the female works at home, she foregoes the opportunity to accumulate higher human capital that increases her future wages. In the model, this decreases the value of her future outside option and therefore her share of the future household surplus, putting her at a disadvantage relative to the male. Therefore, the Pareto optimal allocation can emerge as an equilibrium outcome only if she is compensated for her foregone labor market opportunities.
Such compensations and promises for future transfers are not feasible under limited commitment.
The solution to the household allocation problem in the case of a married household is closer to the first-best outcome under full commitment. This is because participation constraints bind less frequently for a married household due to the higher separation costs.
Data
The core PSID sample consists of two independent samples: a cross-sectional national sample, For the years 1968-1977, the PSID does not make the distinction between marriage and permanent cohabitation, and identifies a respondent in either kind of relationship as "married.".
Starting in 1978, the survey records the legal marital status of the head, which can be used to distinguish between those who are legally married and those who are cohabiting. After 1993, the survey asks only for the legal marital status so it is no longer possible to distinguish a respondent who is single from one who is cohabiting using these questions. Alternatively, starting in 1983, the PSID records in greater detail the relationship of each member of the household to the head.
First-year cohabiters are identified by a special code, as are "permanent cohabiters," defined as those cohabiters who have been in the household long enough to have appeared in an earlier wave of the survey. (Information such as hours worked that is collected for wives is also collected for permanent cohabiters.) From the relationship code assigned to the head's wife or partner, we are able to construct an alternative measure of the relationship's status.
For our tabulations, we use both approaches to identify married and cohabiting couples, using one if the other is ambiguous, and discarding the few observations where the two measures contradict each other. When we report transition probabilities by the duration of the relationship in its current status, we keep only observations where we can clearly identify the start of the relationship. 5 Because the PSID is administered only once per year, there is a limit to the precision with which we can identify the length of a relationship. For example, a relationship that is observed in one wave and has dissolved or changed status by the next wave is assumed to have lasted for one year. Similarly, this holds for a relationship that is observed for longer. The method by which we identify married and cohabiting couples does not let us clearly identify the relationship status of any observations before 1977. Therefore we do not use data collected prior to this year.
After 1997, the PSID switched to a biannual format. In order to maximize the number of observations for the later cohorts, we use available information on dates of marriage and divorce and the movements of individual household members to construct the relationship status of respondents during years in which data was not collected. This is particularly important for our analysis as information on labor income and hours worked are collected for the calendar year before the year of each survey, which is the "off-year" after the survey format changes. When we are able to do so, we assign to that year the relationship status as of the mid-point of the year.
Couples who were cohabiting or married in both the preceding and following year are assumed to have the same status during the intervening year. When a new marriage is observed in a year following one in which no data was collected, we use the marriage history to identify if the marriage began before or after the middle of the previous year. Similarly, when a new cohabiting relationship is observed, we use the dates on which the partner moved into the household to determine if they had begun to cohabit before or after that date. Using a combination of the marriage date and the move-in date, we are able to identify if a newly married couple had been living together un-married in the preceding year. For a relationship that ends between two survey waves, we use the same approach to assess the status of the relationship at the middle of the intervening year. In this case, we use dates of divorce or separation from the marriage history files as well as the move-out dates of former household members.
Over the course of the sample period, we observe the respondents in 3,667 relationships with distinct partners. In 25% of these, the couple lives together un-married, either before or without ultimately getting married. 65% of relationships are observed to eventually be married. Of all cohabiting relationships, 45% eventually result in marriage. Conversely, we observe that 18% of marriages begin as cohabiting relationships. The true number is likely higher as our tabulation excludes episodes of pre-marital cohabitation that were sufficiently short that respondent was not interviewed during the period. Table 2 shows the annual labor market and housework hours worked by marital status and presence of children in the household. Our model predicts that because cohabiting couples have a lower level of commitment and are more likely to dissolve the relationship, they are less able to specialize. Traditionally, the male partner specializes in labor-market production and the female partner in home-production, so we hypothesize that married or cohabiting women should work less in the labor force and more at home than single women, but that this effect should be stronger for married women. As a simple descriptive test of this hypothesis, we regress the number of hours worked by women on dummy variables for marital and cohabitation status, controlling for age and children and including person-specific fixed effects. The results of this regression are shown in Table 3 . We find that married women do work less than single women, but the effect of cohabitation compared to being single is statistically insignificant. A similarly specified regression for men reveals that both cohabiting and married men tend to work more than single men, with married men working more than those cohabiting.
Having described the marriage and cohabitation patterns of our PSID sample, we consider the differences in housework hours between couples of different relationship status. In married couples with children, the wife performs an average of 20 hours of housework and the husband 8. The corresponding numbers for cohabiting couples with children are 18 hours for the female partner and 10 for the male partner, suggesting that cohabiting couples do engage in less traditional gender specialization than married couples. To be more careful about other factors that might affect the division of housework, we regress the hours of housework for both partners on dummies for the relationship status, controlling for number of children, hours worked in the labor market by both partners, and person-specific fixed effects. The results of this regression are shown in Table 4 . We find that in legal marriages, compared to cohabitation, the wife works an an additional 1.9 hours per week in the house and the husband 2.0 hours fewer. Thus our conclusion regarding the effect of the relationship status on specialization seems fairly robust. Number of children by relationship status (by cohort), 6) Transition rates between relationship status, and having a child in subsequent periods (by cohort). The method of moments estimator used is defined as follows:
Estimation Method
The weights are the inverse of the estimated variances obtained from the micro-data, divided by the number of individuals that contribute to each moment. g(θ) is defined as follows:
where {m 1 , ..,m k , ...,m K } correspond to each of the data moments defined above, and
} are the corresponding model moments. N denotes the number of individuals in the sample.
Estimation Results
Below we present the estimation results. We made a number of choices in the estimation in the interest of keeping the problem at a manageable size for computation.
We approximate the decision problem by using discrete distributions to represent distributions of the match quality θ, and wage shocks ε. Following Kennan (2004), we specify a continuous distribution for each of the two shocks, and given the parameters of this distribution, we specify a discrete approximation to it. The estimation results are obtained by allowing for n θ = n ε = 3 support points for the discrete approximation. We find that especially marriage and cohabitation rates can be sensitive to higher number of support points for the match quality distribution.
We also discretize the decision variable for labor supply. In the model, there are three choices regarding labor supply and housework hours. For labor supply, choices for daily hours are 0, 4 and 8, which correspond to not working, working part-time, and full-time. For housework hours, choices for daily hours are 0,3,6, and 9. These numbers are then translated into their weekly or annual counterparts in the data.
We use a grid for the Pareto Weights, µ, also. The estimation results reported here are obtained by setting n µ = 5. We find that simulated moments are sensitive to the number of grid points allowed for the Pareto weight as well, although to a less extent than they are to the θ specification. Unobserved heterogeneity in utility of marriage and wages is introduced by allowing for two types.
Model Fit
Below we present the within-sample fit for chosen moments in the estimation. However, for college educated females, the model understates the hourly wages. Figure 1 shows the marriage and cohabitation rates by age for males and females. The model fits reasonably well the marriage rates of females marriage rates of females by their education level. However, the marriage rates of males are overstated by the model, especially for high school graduates. This is because the production function parameters are very closely linked to the incentives to get married and cohabit in the model, but they also closely govern the labor market hours and housework hours. For example, when the substitutability between the housework hours inputs of males and females in the home production technology is high, the efficient household allocation entails full specialization, given the higher labor market wages of males. However, in the data it is observed that males do not work 0 hours at home. They work positive amount of hours, albeit much less than women (on average, married males work 11 hours per week and married women with kids work 28 hours per week). Home production technology parameters closely govern marriage rates, as well as housework hours and labor market hours.
For example, when we run an experiment to make the housework hours of males and females more complements, so that we set ν = −0.5, we observe that marriage rates fall and cohabitation rates increase considerably. When housework hours are complements, there are no gains from specialization. When housework hours are complements, the hours worked at home for both men and women increase considerably, as now men put more hours at home due to the fact that the marginal product of their hour input has increased relative to the labor market wages.
Relationship gains in this case are more due to consumption complementarities rather than production complementarities, and marriage no longer has any advantages over cohabitation.
In short, the close link between home production technology parameters to labor market and housework hours makes it difficult to match marriage rates as well as we would like.
Policy Experiments 8 Experiment I: Giving Cohabitants Marriage Rights
In Experiment I, we treat the couples who choose to cohabit as though they were married. Since the only difference between the two relationship states is the cost of separation in the model, we implement this by equating the cost of separation for cohabitants to that of married couples. Table ? ? displays the marriage and cohabitation rates under the baseline and in Experiment I with higher cohabitation separation costs. When the cost of separation is equated between the two relationship states, the cohabitation rates decline to 0, as we would expect. Interestingly, the proportion of individuals who choose to live together overall (whether married or cohabiting)
remains the same. This means that those couples who chose to cohabit in the baseline due to the fact that their initial match quality draw was not high enough, still choose to get get together through marriage, when cohabitation is not option to them anymore. These are couples for whom the gains from hedging against future negative match quality shocks through cohabitation outweigh the gains from specialization through marriage, due to their relatively low match quality draws. For this reason, under the baseline, they choose to cohabit. In Experiment I, these couples still choose together, albeit through marriage since cohabitation is not an option anymore.
The gains from living together due to marriage utility, match quality, children and the public good mean that living together outweighs being single despite the uncertainty regarding the relationship match quality.
Experiment II: Increasing Divorce Costs
The estimated model is used to assess the impact of increasing divorce costs on marriage and cohabitation patterns, as well as labor market outcomes. In Experiment II, we increase the cost of divorce by 50 percent.
When divorce costs increase, the total proportion of people who live together (as married or cohabiting) does not change. However, among the couples who live together, the proportion who choose to cohabit and the proportion who chooses to marry changes.
With higher divorce costs, the proportion of couples who cohabit rather than marry at the beginning of a relationship increases considerably. Higher divorce costs make separation more difficult within marriage. This increases the attractiveness of cohabitation due to individuals' ability to hedge against future negative match quality shocks within this relationship choice.
Due to the higher cost of separation within marriage, the reservation match quality value (θ * ) to get married increases. Now individuals get married only if they have a very high match quality draw, when they meet a potential partner. However, the quality of match draws conditional on cohabiting increases also. This is because the matches who previously chose to get married under the baseline, but who now choose cohabitation (the switchers) join the right tail of the conditional match quality distribution for cohabitant households. Hence, the expected value of match qualities conditional on both relationship states increase.
As expected, higher divorce costs, lead to a considerable decline in average divorce rates among married couples. Higher divorce costs also lead to a decline in the average separation rates of cohabiting couples, due to the differential selectivity into cohabitation under this policy experiment.
Conclusion
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